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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]

vs.

)

GARY KEVIN BRENSIKE,

]

DC No: 971021579 FS
CP No: 981691-CA
Priority No: 2

Defendant/Appellant.

;

OPENING BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
I.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (e) (Supp. 1998), and pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 26(2) (a)
(1998).
II•
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Whether the Appellant/Defendant's ("Defendant") Sixth

Amendment right to effective counsel was violated.

All alleged

violations will be advanced in separate subcategories within his
first argument.
1.

Standard of Review

When a "claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is raised for
the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it
presents a question of law."

State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 542

(Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175
(Utah App. 1992)) .
B.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's Motion

for Mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor inquired into
Defendant's in-custody status during the trial?

1.

Standard of Review

"The standard of review for ruling on motions for mistrial
due to prosecutorial misconduct is abuse of discretion."

State

v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997).
C.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit

Defendant's proposed reasonable alternative hypothesis
instruction to the jury?
1.

Standard of Review

"'Whether [a] trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury
instruction constitutes error is a question of law, [and is]
review[ed] for correctness.'"

State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,

1231 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238
(Utah 1992)) (brackets inserted).
This issue was submitted in Defendant's Docketing Statement.
After reviewing the Record, see Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 297, lines
11-25, and id. at 298, lines 1-19, the Defendant now withdraws
this issue.

The facts and case law support the conclusion that

the trial court did not err in refusing to submit Defendant's
requested reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction to the
jury.

See Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1233 ("[W]e have clearly held

that no such reasonable alternative [hypothesis instruction] be
mentioned where, as here, the jury is instructed that the State
must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.")
(citing State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985) (citing
State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1985))).

2

Accord: State

v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 799 (Utah 1991); State v. Burton, 642
P.2d 716, 719 (Utah 1982).
III.
1.

U.S. Const., Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

2.

Utah Const., Article I § 7 and Article I § 12.
IV.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE
After trial by jury in the Third Judicial District Court, in

and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Stephen L.
Henriod presiding, the Defendant was convicted of Forgery, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501
(Supp. 1998), and attempted Theft by Deception, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (Supp.
1998).
B.

This appeals follows.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 2nd, 1997, the Defendant rented a U-Haul truck

("truck") to move some possessions.
lines 1-5.

Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 24 0,

Lawrence Novak ("Mr. Novak") was going to help.

at lines 8-24.

Id.

Around 9:00 a.m., on that day, the Defendant

picked Mr. Novak up in Draper, Utah.

Id. at 241, lines 1-14.

They then departed to the residence of some friends Mr. Novak
knew in Sandy, Utah, which was close to a Wal-Mart store.

Id. at

243, lines 3-18.
After they arrived, around 9:30 a.m., Mr. Novak told the
Defendant he wanted to take the truck to go and get something to
eat; the Defendant said, okay.

Id. at 244, lines 7-17.
3

The

Defendant did not have contact with Mr. Novak again until
approximately 12:00 p.m.

Id. at 22-25.

Prior to seeing Mr.

Novak again, the Defendant asked Mr. Novak's friends to give him
a ride; they agreed and took him.

Id. at 245, lines 13-17.

The

Defendant located the truck in the Wal-Mart parking lot; it was
locked so he went looking for Mr. Novak.

Id. at lines 18-21.

first went to some food establishments, then to Wal-Mart.

He

Id. at

lines 22-25; see id. at 246, line 1.
Once inside Wal-Mart, the Defendant went to the electronics
section.

Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 246, lines 5-6.

After some

disturbance inside the store caused by the Defendant, the
Defendant left the store and returned to the residence.
251, lines 4-15.

Id. at

When he got there, Mr. Novak was there; the

Defendant got the keys to the truck from him.
25; see id. at 252, lines 1-2.

Id. at lines 16-

Mr. Novak told the Defendant the

reason he had not returned sooner was because the truck had
broken down; he also told the Defendant he was down by Wal-Mart.
Id. at lines 5-7; id. at 245, lines 1-4.

The Defendant then

asked Mr. Novak's friends for a ride, however, they declined,
saying they did not want to get involved; they did give him a
bike and a sweatshirt.

Id. at 252, lines 4-10.

Thereafter, the Defendant went to the truck, located in the
Wal-Mart lot, placed the bike in the back of the truck, and left.
Id. at lines 11-16.

He was later pulled over, asked to exit the

vehicle and told to put his hands behind his back.
17-24.

Id. at lines

While cuffed and on the ground, an officer asked someone
4

if they could identify the Defendant.
Identification was by Shane Rowley.

Id. at 253, lines 6-13.
Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 163.

The Defendant was then transported to the Sandy City Police
Department, and questioned.
18-24.

Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 253, lines

Prior to interrogating the Defendant, Sandy City Police

Detective Hal Cutler ("Det. Cutler") informed him of his rights
per Miranda.1

Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 228, lines 23-24.

See also

Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 196, lines 3-4; id. at 201, lines 12-14.
While Det. Cutler was interrogating the Defendant, he invoked his
Miranda right to counsel.

See Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 225, lines

5-25; id. at 226, lines 1-4.

See also Tr. Trans., Vol. II at

260, lines 14-23, and id. at 261, lines 1-4.
During the course of the trial, the jury's attention was
directed seven times to the fact that during his post-arrest
interview with the officers, the Defendant invoked his Miranda
right to counsel.

The prosecution first attracted the jury's

attention to this fact.
25; id. at 226, line 1-4.

See Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 225, lines 5Then, trial counsel had the Defendant

remark about it the next three times.
17-23; id. at 261, lines 2-4.

Tr. Trans, Vol. II at 260,

The last three times, the

prosecutor again directed the jurors attention to the fact the
Defendant invoked his Miranda right to counsel.

See Tr. Trans.,

Vol. II at 284, lines 17-19; id. at 285, lines 14-16; see id. at
lines 22-24.

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5

In addition to the foregoing, during the course of the
trial, the prosecutor, numerous times, also focused the jury's
attention to the fact the Defendant was incarcerated in June of
1997, just slightly before trial, even though there was a pretrial order he not mention the Defendant's character.
Trans., Vol. II at 301, lines 22-35.

See

Tr.

Trial counsel did not make

a contemporaneous objection, however, she stated her objection at
the conclusion of the trial.

Based on her objection, trial

counsel moved for a mistrial.
300, lines 1-21.

Id. at 299, lines 1-25, and id. at

The trial court denied the motion.

Id. at 301,

lines 22-25; id. at 302, lines 1-19.
Finally, during the trial, the prosecutor, after a series of
questions about Det. Cutler's alleged experience in handwriting,
see Tr. Trans., Vol. I. at 226, lines 6-21, asked him if "it
would have been possible . . . for [him] to take [the
Defendant's] handwritten statement and compare it to the
handwriting [he] ha[s] on Exhibit 1, the check."
22-25.

Trial counsel objected.

Id. at lines

Id. at 227, lines 1-2.

After a

sidebar, trial counsel stated her ground: "Your honor, as I
indicated, I object to this witness answering the question Mr.
Jones posed to him because of lack of notice which is required by
statute."
objection.

Id. at lines 6-9.

The trial court sustained her

See id. at lines 10-11.

Although the trial court

sustained trial counsel's objection, during closing argument, the
prosecutor made reference and/or vouched for Det. Cutler as being
a handwriting expert four times.
6

Tr. Trans. Vol. II at 317, line

20; id. at 347, lines 23-25; id. at 348, lines 1-2, and lines 37; id. at lines 17-18.
V.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Defendant asserts that trial counsel's performance was
deficient because she failed to object to the prosecutor
eliciting testimony about Defendant's invocation of his Miranda
right to counsel during his post-arrest interview with the
investigating officers, failure to move the trial court for a new
trial, failure to request an admonition and a curative
instruction violated the Defendant's due process rights.
are areas which the prosecutor should not comment upon.

These
And, by

commenting thereon, the prosecutor violated the Defendant's due
process rights.

Moreover, trial counsel was deficient because

she also elicited testimony from the Defendant about his
constitutional Fifth Amendment right to counsel.

This deficient

performance by counsel also prejudiced because of the
circumstances by which the prosecutor brought it out in court.
Additionally, trial counsel should have also objected at the
outset of the questioning of Det. Cutler, as that questioning
related to the prosecutor's attempts to establish Det. Cutler as
an expert witness in handwriting analysis.

The prosecutor had

failed to provide counsel with notice that he intended to use
Det. Cutler as an alleged witness.

Because there was no notice,

then Det. Cutler should not have been asked any question relating
to his alleged expertise in that area.

Given there was no

notice, and given that the trial court affirmed counsel's
7

objection, she should have objected during closing argument when
the prosecutor made reference to Det. Cutler as an expert in
handwriting analysis or objected because the prosecutor was
vouching for Det. Cutler as an expert.

This deficient

performance prejudiced the Defendant because the prosecutor's
comments effectively prevented the jury from performing their
exclusive role, that is, properly assessing the evidence.
Finally, the prosecutor made numerous comments to the jury
that the Defendant had been incarcerated in June of 1997, just
prior to trial.

The jury was also with knowledge that the

alleged crime occurred on October 2nd, 1996.

The jury would

infer he is a dangerous and bad person because he is still in
jail eight and one-half months later.

These comments by the

prosecutor denied the Defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights because the Defendant's presumption of innocence
was impaired.
VI.

ARGUMENTS

I. WHETHER DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED
A.

Due process violation
Defendant's first claim is that trial counsel was

ineffective because she failed to object when the prosecutor
elicited testimony that the Defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment
right to counsel, failed to move the trial court for a mistrial,
failed to request the trial court to admonish the prosecutor to
not question any witness about this fact, and trial counsel
failed to request a curative instruction.
8

Trial counsel was also ineffective because on direct she
also questioned the Defendant about the fact he invoked his right
to counsel.

Not only was this line of questioning improper, but

it opened the door for the prosecutor on cross-examination to
resume what he initiated, that is, call the jury's attention to
the fact the Defendant invoked his Miranda right to counsel.
1.

Standard

"The Sixth Amendment provides that an accused has the right
to assistance of counsel in all criminal proceedings."

Houchin

v. Zavaris, 107 F.3d 1465, 1471 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing U.S.
Const, amend VI).

"[T]his right to assistance of counsel

includes the right to effective assistance of counsel."

Id.

(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)).
"'The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness
must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.'"

State v. Holland,

876 P.2 357, 362 (Utah 1994) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
686).

"In considering claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel, Utah courts have consistently applied the test
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland,
[sic]."

State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993)

(internal quotations omitted; citations omitted).

See State v.

Arcruelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) ("In determining whether
[sic] counsel was constitutionally ineffective, we apply the twoprong test established in Strickland [sic].").
9

"'In order to bring a successful ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, [the Defendant] must show that trial counsel's
performance was deficient in that it "fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness," and that the deficient performance
prejudiced the outcome of the trial.'"

State v. Bryant, 965 P.2d

539, 542 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 68788) (citing State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 635 (Utah App. 1997)
and State v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993))).
"When a defendant claims that trial counsel's performance was
deficient, [appellate courts] must 'indulge in the strong
presumption counsel's conduct falls within the wide range
reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must
overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the
challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy."'"
Garrett, 849 P.2d at 579 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689)
(quoting Michel v. Louisana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
"To show prejudice under the second prong of the Strickland
test, 'a defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different."'"

Arquelles, 921

P.2d at 441 (quoting Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah
1994), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. (1994) (quoting Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694)).

"A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the
verdict."

State v. Alvarado, 845 P.2d 966, 970 (Utah App. 1993)

(citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694) .
10

Prior to evaluating the Strickland standard to the facts of
this case, a procedural matter must first be evaluated.

In Utah,

"[g]enerally, an appellant cannot raise an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim for the first time on appeal because the trial
record is insufficient to allow the claim to be determined."
State v. Villarreal, 857 P.2d 949, 953 (Utah App. 1993) (citing
State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)).

Accord

Alvarado, 845 P.2d at 970/ State v. Schnoor, 845 P.2d 947, 950
(Utah App. 1993) . "However, an appellant can raise such a claim
if the trial record is adequate to permit determination of the
issue and there is new counsel on appeal."

Alvarado, 845 P.2d

966 (citing Humphries. 818 P.2d at 1029 and State v. Johnson. 823
P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App. 1991)).

Accord: State v. Chacon, 962

P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998); State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah
1996).

"Judicial economy will be served thereby."

Humphries.

818 P.2d at 1029.
The Defendant submits this Court can reach the merits of his
Sixth Amendment claims because the trial record is adequate to
permit determination of his claims, and he is represented by new
counsel.

Thus, remand pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 23B(a) is

unnecessary.

See Chacon. 962 P.2d at 50 (Remand motion denied

"because the record before [it] was adequate to evaluate the
merits of the issues raised.").
2.

Deficient performance

"Under Miranda, [sic] a defendant enjoys rights to counsel
and to remain silent."

United States v. Ross. 123 F.3d 1181,
11

1187 (9th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 118 S. Ct. 733 (1998).

"As a

necessary corollary, the government is prohibited from using
against a defendant his decision to exercise those rights."
(citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976)).

Id.

Additionally,

in State v. Urias, 609 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme
Court stated that it "agree[s] with the proposition that when a
person invokes his constitutional rights, the prosecution should
not comment thereon, nor use it in any way that will tend to
impair or destroy that privilege."
citations omitted).

Id. at 1328 (footnote and

Further, in Freeman v. Class, 911 F. Supp.

402 (D. S.D. 1995), the Court concluded that "[i]t would have
been reversible error for the prosecutor, over objection of the
defendant, to have commented on the defendant's exercise of his
constitutional right to remain silent."

Id. at 409 (citing

United States v. Nolan, 416 F.2d 588, 593 (10th Cir. 1969)).

The

Court also concluded that "[t]here was no reasonable tactical
reason why defense counsel did not object to these comments."
Id.

The Court further stated that "[a] motion for a mistrial

would also have been appropriate and should have been made.

At a

minimum, defense counsel should have requested an admonition from
the trial court, instructing the jury to disregard such matters."
See id.
If the government is prohibited from using against a
criminal defendant his decision to exercise his right to counsel,
and given that the prosecutor should not comment thereon, it
follows that trial counsel was deficient for not objecting when
12

the prosecutor elicited testimony about Defendant's invocation of
his right to counsel.

See, e.g., State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187,

1205 (Utah 1984) ("[I]t was error for defense counsel not to
object to the questions asked by the prosecutor [.]") .
Additionally, if trial counsel was deficient for not objecting to
the prosecutor's questions, she, too, was deficient for asking
the same questions.

See LajLrby, 699 P. 2d at 1205 (" [I]t was

error for defense counsel . . . [herself] to ask questions on the
subject.") (ellipsis inserted).
Trial counsel was also deficient for not moving the trial
court for a mistrial.

See Freeman, 911 F. Supp. at 409 ("A

motion for mistrial would also have been appropriate and should
have been made.").

Counsel was ineffective because she should

have also requested a curative instruction.

See United States v.

Daoud, 741 F.2d 478, 480 (1st Cir. 1984) ("[DJistrict court erred
in refusing to grant a curative instruction.

Defendant had a

constitutional right not to be penalized for invoking her right
to counsel[.]").
Given the foregoing, the Defendant asserts he has satisfied
the first prong of the Strickland test inasmuch as trial
counsel's representation was deficient in that it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness.

"No sound course of trial

strategy could dictate defense counsel to be silent [.]"
Humphries, 818 P.2d at 1030. The Defendant having satisfied the
first prong of the Strickland test, must now show that trial
counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the trial's outcome.
13

3.

Whether the Defendant was prejudiced by counsel's
deficient performance

In Lindgren v. Lane, 925 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 831 (1991), the "petitioner argue [d] that the
rule of Doyle as extended in Greenfield [sic] was violated when
the prosecutor elicited testimony at trial concerning [his] postarrest request for counsel."

Id. at 201.

With respect to the

invocation of the petitioner's right to counsel, the Court noted
that "Doyle and the cases applying the rule against using a
defendant's post-arrest silence against him center the
constitutional inquiry around the particular use to which the
post-arrest silence is being put."

Id. at 202.

Specifically,

the Court stated that it "must look at the circumstances in which
a criminal defendant's post-arrest silence or request for counsel
is revealed in court in order to determine whether the purposes
underlying the rule in Doyle have been undermined."

Id.

See

Daoud, 741 F.2d at 480 ("When the prosecution reveals at trial
that a defendant asked for a lawyer after his arrest, courts have
looked at all the circumstances under which the disclosure was
made in order to determine how seriously in the eyes of the jury
it may have penalized defendant's exercise of his right to
counsel.").
After being given his Miranda warning, the Defendant invoked
his right to counsel.

The first was his refusal to submit to a

writing exemplar without counsel.
lines 5-25; id. at 226, lines 1-4.

See Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 225,
He also had invoked it

because he felt "they were turning it into some kind of crime [he
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was] involved in, or something[.]"

See Tr. Trans., Vol. II at

260, lines 14-23, and id. at 261, lines 1-4.

He also invoked his

right to counsel because the investigating officers were not
listening to him.

Id. at 261, lines 2-4.

The prosecutor first informed the jury of the fact the
Defendant had invoked his right to counsel.

See Tr. Trans., Vol.

I at 225, lines 5-25; id. at 226, line 1-4.

Then, trial counsel

had the Defendant remark about it the next three times.
Trans, Vol. II at 260, 17-23; id. at 261, lines 2-4.

Tr.

The

prosecutor then again informed the jury of the fact the Defendant
invoked his Miranda right to counsel.

See Tr. Trans., Vol. II at

284, lines 17-19; id. at 285, lines 14-16; see id. at lines 2224.
As previously noted, it was the prosecutor who first
informed the jury of the fact that the Defendant invoked his
right to counsel during his post-arrest interview with Det.
Cutler.

Tr. Trans., Vol. I at 226, lines 3-4.

The prosecutor

exploited the fact because he knew that the Defendant's defense
was essentially based upon the Defendant's contention that he did
not write the alleged forged check, and that it was Mr. Novak who
had written the check.

There was not need for the prosecutor to

have Det. Cutler mention that the Defendant had invoked his right
to counsel.

Det. Cutler could have simply informed the jury that

the Defendant refused to provide a writing exemplar.
On direct examination by trial counsel, the Defendant told
the jury that the reason he wanted an attorney was because he
15

wanted counsel present when submitting a writing exemplar.
Trans., Vol. I at 260, line 17-19.

Tr.

He also told the jury he

wanted an attorney because "they were turning [the investigation]
into some kind of crime [he was involved in] ."
23.

Id. at lines 21-

He also told the jury he invoked his right to counsel

because the investigating officers were not listening to him.
Id. at 261, lines 2-4.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor told the Defendant,
"you refused to give Det. Cutler a handwriting sample, didn't
you."

Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 284, lines 17-18.

The prosecutor

again exploited the fact that Defendant requested counsel.

He

knew what the Defendant would say, and he did say, "Without a
lawyer present."

Id. at line 19.

The prosecutor also told the Defendant, "But you admit that
he asked you for a handwriting sample?"

Id. at 7-8.

The

prosecutor then asked the Defendant essentially the same
question.

"Well, then, why didn't you give [him the handwriting

sample], sir?"

Id. at 285, line 14.

The Defendant again

responded that the reason was " [b]ecause [he] wanted a lawyer
present because there was something strange about that."
lines 15-16.

In response, the prosecutor told the Defendant,

"Something strange about trying to prove your innocence?"
lines 17-18.
exploitation.

Id. at

Id. at

This comment by the prosecutor is yet another clear
He is striking at the heart of the Defendant's

exculpatory story.
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The prosecutor again asked the Defendant, "So instead of
giving him the sample and letting him solve the case --"
lines 22-23.

The Defendant again told the prosecutor he had

invoked his right to counsel, "Without a lawyer present.
right."

Id. at

See id. at line 24.

It's my

The prosecutor responded, "You

thought he was going to trick you or something like that."

Id.

at line 25; see id at 286, line 1.
The foregoing examples show that the Defendant's due process
rights, as delineated in Doyle and extended in Wainwright were
violated.

This is because the prosecutor exploited Defendant's

exercise of his Miranda right to counsel.
convictions should be reversed.

As such, Defendant's

Given they should be reversed,

it logically follows that the Defendant was prejudiced by trial
counsel's deficient performance.
B.

Counsel was ineffective for failing to object at the
outset of the State's attempts to establish Det. Cutler as
a handwriting expert and because she failed to object during
closing argument about the prosecutor saying Det. Cutler was
an expert
1.

Deficient performance

Defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective because
she failed to object at the outset of the prosecutor's attempt to
qualify Det. Cutler as an expert, failed to object during closing
argument to the prosecutor's references to Det. Cutler as being a
handwriting expert, and failed to object to the prosecutor
vouching for Det. Cutler as a handwriting expert.
The issue here, as in United States v. Small, 74 F.3d 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1996), was "whether the prosecutor's errors in . . .
17

closing argument, by referring to matters that were never
introduced into evidence at trial, denied [Defendant] a fair
trial by causing undue prejudice or by preventing the jury from
properly assessing the evidence."

Id. at 1281 (citing Frazier v.

Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 735-36 (1969)).
During the prosecutor's examination of Det. Cutler, he asked
Det. Cutler whether he has "any expertise in handwriting?"
Trans., Vol. I at 226, line 7.

Tr.

Det. Cutler said he did, and that

he has testified in District Court on handwriting six times.
at lines 8-9.

The prosecutor then inquired as to whether Det.

Cutler went "through courses or classes in handwriting [.]"
at lines 10-11.

Id.

Id.

Det. Cutler said he has, and that he went to "a

13 week course on document examination, been a part of an
organization that gives training about once a month[,] talked to
the State Crime Lab expert numerous times on cases [,] handled
hundreds of cases involving handwriting[, and] continue [s] to
find out whatever [he] can to try to improve the situation [.]"
Id. at lines 12-18.

The prosecutor again directed the jury's

attention to Det. Cutler's alleged experience: "You say you've
testified in court as an expert on handwriting?"
19-20.

Det. Cutler said, "Yes.

Id. at lines

Six times so far."

Id. at line

21.
Relating the foregoing qualifications to the Defendant's
case, the prosecutor then asked Det. Cutler whether "it have been
possible . . . for [him] to take [the Defendant's] handwritten
statement and compare it to the handwriting [he] ha[s] on Exhibit
18

1, the check."

Id. at lines 22-25.

Trial counsel objected, id.

at 227, lines 1-2, a sidebar followed, id. at 3-5, and then in
open court, trial counsel stated her ground for the objection,
which was that she objected to Det. Cutler answering the question
"because of lack of notice which is required by statute."
lines 6-9.

Id. at

The trial court sustained trial counsel's objection.

See id. at lines 10-11.
Trial counsel was deficient for not objecting at the outset
of the prosecutor's first question.

When the prosecutor first

asked Det. Cutler whether he has "any expertise in handwriting,"
trial counsel knew that the prosecutor was attempting to qualify
him as an expert.

An objection should have been made at this

point because by not objecting trial counsel permitted the
prosecutor to lay all the foundation the jury needed to accept
Det. Cutler as a handwriting expert.

An objection would have

been sustained on the same ground, lack of notice.
Similarly, trial counsel was deficient for not objecting
during closing when the prosecutor referred and/or vouched for
Det. Cutler as being a expert in handwriting analysis.

Trial

counsel's objection would have been sustained on the same ground,
lack of notice.

Having satisfied the first prong, the Defendant

now turns to the second Strickland factor.
2.

Prejudice to the Defendant

Trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the
Defendant because her failure to object at the outset permitted
the jury to hear about Det. Cutler's alleged experience in
19

handwriting analysis, which, in turn, permitted the jurors to
infer that they could rely on his experience because he is an
expert.

Statutory notice became meaningless because of trial

counsel's failure to object.
The Defendant was also prejudiced because of trial counsel's
inactivity during closing.

During closing argument, the

prosecutor told the jury that defense counsel "suggested to you
to take a minute and compare, if you want, some of the
handwriting on the check and compare it to the defendant's
statement.

And, you know, while that's true and you certainly

have an opportunity to do that, I would suggest to you that you
should be very careful about falling into that trap, if you
will."

Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 347, lines 16-22.

The prosecutor

also told the jury that " [i]f it were that easy, if we could just
say, 'take a look at this and tell me what you think,' we
wouldn't need to have handwriting experts.

We wouldn't need to

have people like Det. Cutler, who went to school, I think, for 13
or 14 weeks to become an expert.
348 1-2.

Id. at 347, lines 23-25 and p.

Trial counsel should have objected because it had not

been established and the trial court had not accepted Det. Cutler
as an expert in handwriting analysis.
The prosecutor next told the jury, "Because this is one of
the areas in police investigation that really requires an expert.
It requires somebody who has the trained eye and who knows what
to look for when trying to make comparisons between the check and
a known sample of the defendant's handwriting."
20

Id. at 348,

lines 2-7.

The prosecutor went on to tell the jury, "I submit

that it's much harder than it looks.

And while you certainly can

spend your time looking at different letters and numbers and
everything, I'd just caution you, I'd be a little careful, I'd be
a little skeptical about trying to reach any conclusions.
Because if you remember right, Det. Cutler said to the defendant,
'I need a sample of you handwriting.'"

Id. at lines 8-14.

The

prosecutor further told the jury that Det. Cutler "wanted a
sample of the defendant's handwriting in order for him to reach a
conclusion.

And if Det. Cutler, who is trained in handwriting

can't give us an opinion in this courtroom about the handwriting,
I think it's a little difficult for us, without having any
special training, to do that."

See id. at lines 15-20.

The prosecutor's closing arguments wherein he referred
and/or vouched for Det. Cutler as being an expert in the field of
handwriting analysis effectively "prevented the jury from
properly assessing the evidence."

Small, 74 F.3d 1281 (D.C. Cir.

1996) (citing Frazier, 394 U.S. at 735-36).

It is reasonable for

the jury to infer that there was no need for them to attempt to
determine whether the handwriting on the check and the
Defendant's handwriting writing matched because an "expert" such
as Det. Cutler, with all of his experience, could not.

The

prosecutor's actions, and trial counsel's inactions prevented the
Defendant from receiving a fair trial.

Accordingly, Defendant's

convictions should be reversed.
///

\\\
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II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL ON THE GROUND
THAT THE PROSECUTOR INJECTED DEFENDANT'S
CHARACTER INTO EVIDENCE
"[T]he prosecution may not introduce evidence of an accused
character unless the accused himself raises the issue."

State v.

Urias, 609 P.2d 1326, 1329 (Utah 1980) (citation omitted).
the Defendant did not raise the issue.

Here,

Moreover, there was a

pre-trial order in effect which prohibited the prosecutor from
introducing the Defendant's character into evidence.

See

Tr.

Trans., Vol. II at 301, lines 22-35.
However, despite the Court's Order, and case law prohibiting
the prosecutor from compromising the Defendant's presumption of
innocence, the prosecutor repeatedly focused the jury's attention
to the fact the Defendant was incarcerated in June of 1998, just
slightly before trial.

Specifically, the prosecutor told the

Defendant, "And you were there with him, weren't you?"
II at 268, line 19.

Tr. Vol.

Clarifying his question, the prosector told

the Defendant, "[S] ir, is it your testimony you were not in jail
in late June of this year?"

Id. at lines 21-23.

Clarifying his

question again, the prosecutor told the Defendant, "No, sir,
that's not my question.
cell.

I didn't ask if you were in the same

I asked you if it's true both of you were in jail in late

June of this year."

Id. at 269, lines 4-6.

The prosecutor

further told the Defendant, "You were in jail and so was he."
See id. at line 17.
The Defendant submits that the prosecutor's line of
questioning denied the Defendant his Fourteenth Amendment due
22

process right to a fair trial because the Defendant's presumption
of innocence was impaired by the prosecutor's line of
questioning.

And, the trial court erred in not recognizing that

the Defendant's constitutional rights were violated by the
prosecutor's line of questioning.
There are "two dangers flowing from the jury's knowledge of
the defendant's incarceration: (i) it brands the defendant 'in
the eyes of the jurors with an unmistakable mark of guilt' and
(ii) pre-trial incarceration, in particular, while often the
result of nothing more than an inability to raise bail, may lead
the jury to speculate that the defendant is particularly
dangerous." United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051,
1058 n. 6 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Harris, 703
F.2d 508, 510 (11th Cir. 1983) (quoting Estelle v. Williams, 425
U.S. 501, 518-19 (1976) )) .
In the case at bar, the first danger compromised the
Defendant's presumption of innocence because he was branded "with
an unmistakable mark of guilt."
significantly present.

The second danger is

The jury knew that the alleged crime

occurred on October 2nd, 1996, and that the Defendant was
arrested on that day.

Tr. Trans., Vol. II at 253, lines 18-24.

The jury's inference would necessarily be, why is the Defendant
still in jail in June of 1997, over eight months after the
alleged incident, if he is not a dangerous and bad person?
Because the prosecutor injected the Defendant's character into
evidence, the Defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process right
23

to a fair trial was breached and, accordingly, the Defendant
should be entitled to a new trial.
ADDENDUM
No addendum is necessary.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing violations of the Defendant's
constitutional rights, Defendant's convictions should be
reversed.
DATED this 7 \

day of March, 1999.

tevih J. Kurumada
"Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT was MAILED, postage
prepaid, on this

^

day of March, 1999 to:

Utah Attorney General's Office
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
Heber M. "Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

24

